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HANDLE VIA TALENT/KEYHOLE-
COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS

Copy No. 53 of 99
TCS-9537-66

USIB-D-41.12/18
(COMOR-D-7/45)
13 June 1966
Limited Distribution

DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Security Handling of Satellite Reconnaissance Materials

REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-41.12/11 (IBSEC-PR/4)
22 September 1964, Limited Distribution
b. USIB-D-41.12/12 (COMOR-D-7/31)
6 November 1964, Limited Distribution
c. USIB-M-359, 18 November 1964, Item 10
d. USIB-D-41.12/15 (COMOR-D-7/42)
13 September 1965, Limited Distribution
e. USIB-D-41.12/16 (COMOR-D-7/44)
3 November 1965, Special Limited Distribution
f. Secretary's Note, USIB-M-410, 18 November 1965

1. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) by reference d. was asked to consider the following recommendations:

a. Recommendations on security handling of satellite reconnaissance materials submitted by the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), with the concurrence of the Security Committee, in Tab A to reference d., together with the dissenting view of State and Army.

b. The additional and separate recommendations by the Security Committee on definitions and sanitization of COMINT, as reproduced in the Attachment to Tab B of reference d.

Board action on reference d. has been held in abeyance at the request of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) pending the development of a coordinated Defense Department position on this matter.

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2. The attached memorandum from the Director, DIA, on the subject submits for Board consideration the resulting Department of Defense Conclusions in paragraph 2., and recommendations for USIB action in paragraph 3.

3. The revised TALENT Sanitization Manual referred to in paragraph 2. of General Carroll's attached memorandum was circulated by reference e., and USIB noted COMOR's approval of that manual on 17 November 1965 as recorded in reference f.

4. The attached memorandum from the Director, DIA, will be scheduled for USIB consideration at an early date.

25X1A


Executive Secretary

Attachment

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HANDLE VIA TALENT/KEYHOLE
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Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002300010031-3

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Attachment

USIB-D-41.12/18

(COMOR-D-7/45)

13 June 1966

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

9 JUN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Security Handling of Satellite Reconnaissance
Material

1. As you may recall, USIB consideration of the subject: "Security Handling of Satellite Reconnaissance Material" circulated to the Board as USIB-D-41.12/15, was deferred at my request, to provide for a thorough review of this subject by the entire Department of Defense Intelligence Community.
2. Subsequent to that request, this matter has been studied in depth by the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Military Department Intelligence Officers. As a result of this study, we have reached the following conclusions:
 - a. That the presently operating satellite reconnaissance systems are a productive and irreplaceable source of information vital to the National Security.
 - b. That although action to decontrol and downgrade the products of presently operating satellite reconnaissance systems would improve production capability, widen dissemination, and permit direct use of photo imagery thereby improving user confidence in the finished intelligence and map and chart product, such action would also increase the hazard associated with compromise, and could result in loss or degradation of this productive and extremely vital source of information.
 - c. That the effective implementation of the revised TALENT Sanitization Manual should be a reasonable and prudent alternative to decontrol and downgrading, since it offers an opportunity to increase the utilization of the information derived from the products of satellite reconnaissance without increasing the hazards associated with compromise of the National Reconnaissance Program and its present and future products.

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
d. That prior to further consideration of this matter, the revised TALENT Sanitization Manual be fully implemented; the Military Departments and Unified and Specified Commands be tasked to report, not later than 31 December 1966, on the adequacy of the revised manual in meeting the national requirements for both source security and increased utilization of the products of the then operating satellite reconnaissance systems.

3. Based on the above, it is recommended that:

a. USIB note the above Department of Defense Conclusions.

b. During the month of December 1966, all USIB members conduct a review similar to that being conducted by the Department of Defense, with their findings being reported to the Board not later than 1 February 1967.

c. No further action be taken on USIB-D-41.12/15 pending the review of such reports.



JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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